

Message Text

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ARA-06 IO-10 SAM-01 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 /087 W

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P 160745Z DEC 75

FM AMEMBASSY LOURENCO MARQUES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4130

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LOURENCO MARQUES 1335

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AO, TZ, OAU

SUBJECT: TANZANIAN VIEW OF ANGOLA PROBLEM

REF: DAR ES SALAAM 5452

1. AS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST IN CONNECTION WITH VIEWS REPORTED REFTEL, FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION ON ANGOLA WITH TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR KATIKAZA ON DECEMBER 11. KATIKAZA, WHO IS FORMER AMBASSADOR TO ZAMBIA AND FORMER TANZANIAN CHIEF OF PROTOCOL, IS CLOSE TO FRELIMO LEADERSHIP, INCLUDING PRESIDENT MACHEL AND FOREIGN MINISTER CHISSANO, AND CLAIMS HAVE BEEN VERY CLOSE TO PRESIDENT NYERERE FOR MANY YEARS. KATIKAZA KEPT FOR DAR-ES-SALAAM ON DECEMBER 12 TO DISCUSS MATTERS RELATED TO OAU MEETING DECEMBER 19. HE SAID HE PLANNED RETURN TO LOURENCO MARQUES DECEMBER 16, BUT THAT HE MIGHT GO ON DIRECTLY TO ADDIS
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IF HIS PRESIDENT WISHED HIM TO ATTEND MEETING.

2. I OPENED CONVERSATION BY ASKING WHAT KATIKAZA THOUGHT OAU MEETING AND SUBSEQUENT SUMMIT WOULD ACCOMPLISH IN VIEW SERIOUS DIVISIONS AMONG MEMBERS ON ANGOLA ISSUE. KATIKAZA SAID THERE WAS ONE ISSUE ON WHICH THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT: SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION, AND THAT CONDEMNATION OF THAT INTERVENTION WOULD LEAD OFF ANY DECISIONS OR CONCLUSIONS OAU WOULD REACH. HE SAID HE COULD NOT ANTICIPATE WHAT ELSE OAU MIGHT DECIDE, BUT THAT ALL OTHER DECISIONS WOULD BE SUBORDINATE TO THAT ON SOUTH AFRICA.

3. I COMMENTED THAT AS LEGITIMATE AS THIS CONCERN WAS, CONDEMNATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION ALONE WOULD NOT SEEM TO GO VERY FAR TOWARD RESOLVING CONFLICT, AS IT WOULD LEAVE UNTOUCHED WHOLE ISSUE OF SOVIET (AND CUBAN) INTERVENTION. KATIKAZA SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE WERE SO CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIETS (AND MUCH LESS ABOUT CUBANS); SOVIETS HAD BEEN SUPPORTING AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND MPLA IN PARTICULAR FOR MANY YEARS, AND THIS SUPPORT HAS NEITHER RESULTED IN SOVIET CONTROL OF ANY LIBERATED AREA NOR HAD IT PREVIOUSLY PROVOKED SUCH A STRONG WESTERN (MAINLY US) REACTION. SOVIETS WERE DOING IN ANGOLA, HE SAID, WHAT THEY HAD DONE ELSEWHERE, E.G., IN GUINEA, NIGERIA, MOZAMBIQUE. WHAT WAS NEW IN THIS SITUATION WAS SOUTH AFRICAN ROLE AND WESTERN CONCERN. TANZANIA, HE SAID, COULD WELL UNDERSTAND SOUTH AFRICA'S NEED TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST A LEGITIMATE THREAT, AND WEST'S SUPPORT OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS STRUGGLING AGAINST COLONIALISM (E.G., FNLA), BUT NEITHER CONSIDERATION NOW APPLIES IN ANGOLA. TANZANIA'S POLICY VIS-A-VIS SOUTH AFRICA HAS BEEN BASED LARGELY ON HOPE THAT PRESSURES ON SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BRING ABOUT DESIRED INTERNAL CHANGES. TANZANIA, FOR INSTANCE, HAS NOT WORKED FOR EXPULSION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM UN, BUT HAS TRIED TO FINE-TUNE ISSUE SO THAT THE THREAT OF EXPULSION WOULD HANG OVER IT LIKE SWORD OF DAMOCLES. NOW, HOWEVER, SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA IS FORCING A RE-EXAMINATION OF THIS POLICY.

4. I SAID IT WAS NOT MY INTENTION TO ARGUE SOUTH AFRICA'S CASE ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, BUT THAT MANY AFRICANS DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE PERCEIVED THAT WHOLE CHARACTER OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO MPLA HAD UNDERGONE RADICAL CHANGE IN PAST FEW MONTHS, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND THAT SOVIETS SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN POLICY DECISION TO USE ANGOLA AS GROUND ON WHICH TO TEST ASPECTS OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US. I SAID SOVIETS SEEMED TO BE TESTING OUR RESOLVE BY PURSUING A VERY AGGRESSIVE POLICY TO GAIN AN OBJECTIVE THAT BORE LITTLE RELATION TO THAT PURSUED BY THEIR ORIGINAL SUPPORT OF MPLA. FACT THAT LOCALE IN WHICH THIS POLICY BEING PLAYED OUT IS ANGOLA, I SPECULATED, MAY NOW BE SECONDARY TO PRINCIPAL SOVIET OBJECTIVE, ALTHOUGH ANGOLA'S GEOGRAPHIC AND

GEOPHYSICAL SITUATION WAS CERTAINLY A FACTOR. I SAID POINT I WAS TRYING TO MAKE WAS THAT OUR PERCEPTIONS SEEMED TO DIFFER GREATLY BECAUSE THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE WERE INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL AREANA DIFFERED SO GREATLY. THUS, AFRICAN PERCEPTION WAS ON NORTH-SOUTH AXIS AND GENERALLY LIMITED TO AFRICAN CONTINENT, WHERE SOUTH AFRICA LOOMED AS PRINCIPAL THREAT TO INTERESTS OF NUMEROUS INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES. US (OR WESTERN) PERCEPTION, HOWEVER, WAS ON EAST-WEST AXIS, AND WAS WORLD-WIDE, AND PRINCIPAL THREAT WAS EMBODIED IN AGGRESSIVE SOVIET POLICIES. THIS MIGHT EXPLAIN WHY BOTH AFRICA AND THE WEST SEEMED TO BELIEVE THAT EACH WAS FOCUSING TOO SINGLE-MINDEDLY ON THE WRONG "ENEMY" IN ANGOLA.

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AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 LOURENCO MARQUES 1335

5. KATIKAZA THOUGHT THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT INTERESTING. SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT IT AND PERHAPS BRING IT UP IN DAR ES SALAAM. NEVERTHELESS, HE ADDED, HE WAS STILL VERY PUZZLED THAT WEST HAD NOT FELT THIS WAY DURING LARGE SOVIET ASSISTANCE

EFFORTS DURING NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. IF WEST DID NOT FEEL ITS INTERESTS THREATENED THEN, BUT DOES NOW, THEN THERE MUST BE A REASON FOR IT IN AFRICA ITSELF. LOOKING AT THE MAP, HE CONTINUED, THE REASON MUST BE STRATEGIC. NOW THAT THE WEST NO LONGER HAS ACCESS TO SOUTHERN AFRICA THROUGH PORTUGAL, IT MUST, AGAINST EITHER PRESENT OR FUTURE NEED, SECURE ACCESS THROUGH OTHER MEANS; ONE SUCH MEANS WOULD BE THROUGH THE PROTECTION OF ITS PRESENT INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA SO AS TO RETAIN ACCESS TO THAT COUNTRY'S RESOURCES AND STRATEGIC COASTLINE. THUS, IN ANGOLA THE WEST MUST BE SEEKING TO SECURE ITS ACCESS TO ANGOLA ITSELF, BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY IT MUST BE SEEKING TO PROTECT SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST A POTENTIAL THREAT FROM ANGOLA. CONFIDENTIAL

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KATIKAZA SAID HE HAD NOT YET CONVINCED HIMSELF OF THIS ARGUMENT, AND THAT HE HAD NOT MADE IT TO PRESIDENT NYERERE, BUT AS HE THOUGHT ABOUT IT SEEMED TO MAKE MORE AND MORE SENSE. I RECALLED THAT HE HAD TOUCHED ON IT IN A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION, SHORTLY AFTER WHICH PRESIDENT MACHEL HAD EXPRESSED SIMILAR THOUGHTS IN A SPEECH TO FRELIMO (REF LOURENCO MARQUES 1208). KATIKAZA SAID HE HAD NEITHER READ THAT SPEECH NOR TALKED TO MACHEL ABOUT HIS THEORY.

6. WITHIN ANGOLA ITSELF, KATIKAZA THOUGHT THERE WAS STILL A CHANCE FOR POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN MPLA AND FNLA BECAUSE "MANY" IN EACH GROUP REALIZED THAT NEITHER COULD WIN THE MILITARY BATTLE FOR ALL OF ANGOLA. TO SUPPORT HIS POINT, HE REVIEWED HISTORY OF PREVIOUS MPLA/FNLA ACCOMMODATIONS, ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THOSE HAD BEEN DRIVEN BY MUTUAL STRUGGLE AGAINST PORTUGAL AND THAT NONE HAD LASTED FOR LONG. BASIC PROBLEM MILITATING AGAINST AT LEAST TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION DURING WHICH MORE ENDURING ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE WORKED

OUT WERE AMBITIONS OF SAVIMBI AND CHIPENDA. HE CAUTIONED THAT BECAUSE OF THIS WEST SHOULD NOT COUNT ON PERMANENCE OF UNITA/FNLA ASSOCIATION, WHICH HE TERMED "MARRIAGE OF INCONVENIENCE", NOR ON TRUSTWORTHINESS OF SAVIMBI, AND SAID CHIPENDA IS MORE INTRANSIGENT THAN AGOSTINHO NETO. IF THESE AMBITIONS COULD BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL, KATIKAZA ADDED, HE STILL SAW PROSPECTS FOR ACCOMMODATION, NOTWITHSTANDING PERSONAL ANIMOSITY BETWEEN NETO AND ROBERTO, EACH OF WHOM WERE SUBJECT TO STRONG PRESSURES FROM INSIDE THEIR ORGANIZATIONS.

7. RECALLING PERSONAL ANECDOTE, KATIKAZA SAID HE HAD ACCOMPANIED NYERERE TO A MEETING WITH ZAIRE PRESIDENT MOBUTU IN LUBUMBASHI IN MID-1960'S DURING WHICH ISSUE OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO MPLA WAS DISCUSSED. KATIKAZA SAID MOBUTU EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN THAT THIS MIGHT UPSET BALANCE BETWEEN MPLA AND FNLA. KATIKAZA SAID HE SUGGESTED TO MOBUTU THAT LATTER SOUND OUT AMERICANS ON ASSISTING FNLA. MOBUTU ASKED NYERERE WHAT HE

THOUGHT OF THAT. NYERERE SAID HE THOUGHT KATIKAZA WAS OUT OF HIS MIND. KATIKAZA ENDED STORY RATHER SMUGLY, SAYING HE HAD NOT BEEN SO OUT OF LINE AFTER ALL.

8. RE CUBANS, WHEN ASKED WHY MASSIVE EXTRA-CONTINENTAL CUBAN
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PRESENCE IN ANGOLA DID NOT SEEM TO CONCERN SOME AFRICAN, KATIKAZA LOOKED PERPLEXED AND REPLIED SIMPLY: "THEY'RE HELPING". HE WENT ON TO REVIEW CUBAN ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OVER PAST FIFTEEN YEARS AND EXPRESSED EVEN GREATER WONDER AS TO WHY WE WERE SO UPSET ABOUT THEIR PRESENT ROLE IN ANGOLA. I EXPLAINED ESSENTIALS OF RATHER UNIQUE CUBAN-US RELATIONSHIP OVER THE YEARS AND PROBLEMS CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAD CAUSED US SINCE EARLY 1960'S. KATIKAZA WAS UNIMPRESSED, BUT SAID HE WOULD FILL ME IN ON OAU MEETING IF HE ATTENDED.
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